Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties

Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative actions on elections where voters can have ties, extending the definitions of the election systems (when necessary) to handle voters with ties. We show that for natural election systems allowing ties can both increase and decrease the complexity of manipulation and bribery, and we state a general result on the effect of voters with ties on the complexity of control.Comment: A version of this paper will appear in ADT-201

The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control

Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using complexity to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have been obtained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much focus on whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very different approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.Comment: 38 pages, 2 figure

Computational Complexity Characterization of Protecting Elections from Bribery

The bribery problem in election has received considerable attention in the literature, upon which various algorithmic and complexity results have been obtained. It is thus natural to ask whether we can protect an election from potential bribery. We assume that the protector can protect a voter with some cost (e.g., by isolating the voter from potential bribers). A protected voter cannot be bribed. Under this setting, we consider the following bi-level decision problem: Is it possible for the protector to protect a proper subset of voters such that no briber with a fixed budget on bribery can alter the election result? The goal of this paper is to give a full picture on the complexity of protection problems. We give an extensive study on the protection problem and provide algorithmic and complexity results. Comparing our results with that on the bribery problems, we observe that the protection problem is in general significantly harder. Indeed, it becomes $\sum_{p}^2$-complete even for very restricted special cases, while most bribery problems lie in NP. However, it is not necessarily the case that the protection problem is always harder. Some of the protection problems can still be solved in polynomial time, while some of them remain as hard as the bribery problem under the same setting.Comment: 28 Pages. The Article has been accepted in the 26th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2020

Using contracted solution graphs for solving reconfiguration problems.

We introduce a dynamic programming method for solving reconfiguration problems, based on contracted solution graphs, which are obtained from solution graphs by performing an appropriate series of edge contractions that decrease the graph size without losing any critical information needed to solve the reconfiguration problem under consideration. As an example, we consider a well-studied problem: given two k-colorings alpha and beta of a graph G, can alpha be modified into beta by recoloring one vertex of G at a time, while maintaining a k-coloring throughout? By applying our method in combination with a thorough exploitation of the graph structure we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for (k-2)-connected chordal graphs

Using contracted solution graphs for solving reconfiguration problems

We introduce a dynamic programming method for solving reconfiguration problems, based on contracted solution graphs, which are obtained from solution graphs by performing an appropriate series of edge contractions that decrease the graph size without losing any critical information needed to solve the reconfiguration problem under consideration. As an example, we consider a well-studied problem: given two k-colorings alpha and beta of a graph G, can alpha be modified into beta by recoloring one vertex of G at a time, while maintaining a k-coloring throughout? By applying our method in combination with a thorough exploitation of the graph structure we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for (k-2)-connected chordal graphs

Stably computing order statistics with arithmetic population protocols.

In this paper we initiate the study of populations of agents with very limited capabilities that are globally able to compute order statistics of their arithmetic input values via pair-wise meetings. To this extent, we introduce the Arithmetic Population Protocol (APP) model, embarking from the well known Population Protocol (PP) model and inspired by two recent papers in which states are treated as integer numbers. In the APP model, every agent has a state from a set Q of states, as well as a fixed number of registers (independent of the size of the population), each of which can store an element from a totally ordered set S of samples. Whenever two agents interact with each other, they update their states and the values stored in their registers according to a joint transition function. This transition function is also restricted; it only allows (a) comparisons and (b) copy / paste operations for the sample values that are stored in the registers of the two interacting agents. Agents can only meet in pairs via a fair scheduler and are required to eventually converge to the same output value of the function that the protocol globally and stably computes. We present two different APPs for stably computing the median of the input values, initially stored on the agents of the population. Our first APP, in which every agent has 3 registers and no states, stably computes (with probability 1) the median under any fair scheduler in any strongly connected directed (or connected undirected) interaction graph. Under the probabilistic scheduler, we show that our protocol stably computes the median in O(n^6) number of interactions in a connected undirected interaction graph of $n$ agents. Our second APP, in which every agent has 2 registers and O(n^2 log{n}) states, computes to the correct median of the input with high probability in O(n^3 log{n}) interactions, assuming the probabilistic scheduler and the complete interaction graph. Finally we present a third APP which, for any k, stably computes the k-th smallest element of the input of the population under any fair scheduler and in any strongly connected directed (or connected undirected) interaction graph. In this APP every agent has 2 registers and n states. Upon convergence every agent has a different state; all these states provide a total ordering of the agents with respect to their input values

Stably computing order statistics with arithmetic population protocols

In this paper we initiate the study of populations of agents with very limited capabilities that are globally able to compute order statistics of their arithmetic input values via pair-wise meetings. To this extent, we introduce the Arithmetic Population Protocol (APP) model, embarking from the well known Population Protocol (PP) model and inspired by two recent papers in which states are treated as integer numbers. In the APP model, every agent has a state from a set Q of states, as well as a fixed number of registers (independent of the size of the population), each of which can store an element from a totally ordered set S of samples. Whenever two agents interact with each other, they update their states and the values stored in their registers according to a joint transition function. This transition function is also restricted; it only allows (a) comparisons and (b) copy / paste operations for the sample values that are stored in the registers of the two interacting agents. Agents can only meet in pairs via a fair scheduler and are required to eventually converge to the same output value of the function that the protocol globally and stably computes. We present two different APPs for stably computing the median of the input values, initially stored on the agents of the population. Our first APP, in which every agent has 3 registers and no states, stably computes (with probability 1) the median under any fair scheduler in any strongly connected directed (or connected undirected) interaction graph. Under the probabilistic scheduler, we show that our protocol stably computes the median in O(n^6) number of interactions in a connected undirected interaction graph of $n$ agents. Our second APP, in which every agent has 2 registers and O(n^2 log{n}) states, computes to the correct median of the input with high probability in O(n^3 log{n}) interactions, assuming the probabilistic scheduler and the complete interaction graph. Finally we present a third APP which, for any k, stably computes the k-th smallest element of the input of the population under any fair scheduler and in any strongly connected directed (or connected undirected) interaction graph. In this APP every agent has 2 registers and n states. Upon convergence every agent has a different state; all these states provide a total ordering of the agents with respect to their input values

More Natural Models of Electoral Control by Partition

"Control" studies attempts to set the outcome of elections through the addition, deletion, or partition of voters or candidates. The set of benchmark control types was largely set in the seminal 1992 paper by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick that introduced control, and there now is a large literature studying how many of the benchmark types various election systems are vulnerable to, i.e., have polynomial-time attack algorithms for. However, although the longstanding benchmark models of addition and deletion model relatively well the real-world settings that inspire them, the longstanding benchmark models of partition model settings that are arguably quite distant from those they seek to capture. In this paper, we introduce--and for some important cases analyze the complexity of--new partition models that seek to better capture many real-world partition settings. In particular, in many partition settings one wants the two parts of the partition to be of (almost) equal size, or is partitioning into more than two parts, or has groups of actors who must be placed in the same part of the partition. Our hope is that having these new partition types will allow studies of control attacks to include such models that more realistically capture many settings

False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time

False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10] for the probabilistic Banzhaf index. All these results provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley--Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic polynomial time", and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the number of false identities is fixed, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. It follows from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, which is considered highly unlikely

Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter~$v$, we also have to add a whole bundle $\kappa(v)$ of voters associated with $v$. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.Comment: An extended abstract appears in MFCS 201